Crises in the USSR: Are the Constitutional and Legislative Changes Enough by unknown
Cornell International Law Journal
Volume 23
Issue 2 Symposium 1990 Article 9
Crises in the USSR: Are the Constitutional and
Legislative Changes Enough
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cilj
Part of the Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Cornell International Law Journal by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please
contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
(1990) "Crises in the USSR: Are the Constitutional and Legislative Changes Enough," Cornell International Law Journal: Vol. 23: Iss. 2,
Article 9.
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cilj/vol23/iss2/9
Roundtable Discussion
Crises in the USSR: Are the
Constitutional and Legislative
Changes Enough?
[The Cornell International Law Journal hosted the Symposium confer-
ence on February 16 and 17, 1990, in Ithaca, New York. The
Roundtable Discussion, the finale of the conference, brought
together European, Soviet, and American voices to comment on
the most recent changes and the viability of Gorbachev's legal
reforms. Less than two weeks before the Symposium, the Commu-
nist Party announced it would eliminate article 6 from the Soviet
Constitution, which provided for the Communist Party's political
monopoly within the Soviet system. Gorbachev continued to
enlarge the powers of the constitutional presidency. In this atmos-
phere of reform, the depth and speed of which continued to sur-
prise the world, the participants gathered to debate.
[Whereas the articles of the Symposium focus on both new
laws as well as the constitutional amendments, the Roundtable Dis-
cussion heavily emphasizes the latter. The amendments to the
1977 Constitution of the USSR provide a new structure under
which laws may be promulgated. To what extent is this new consti-
tutional structure linked to Gorbachev's success as a leader?
[The Soviet Union is learning to operate as a State under the
rule of law. How viable is such a concept in the Soviet context?
Can the Soviets develop a legal culture? Can Soviet Communist
ideology withstand such a culture? Gorbachev has laid the political
path for democratization and now must find ways to harness new
freedom through law. Will these laws have meaning beyond the
paper on which they are printed? The panelists delve into history
to find parallels. They speculate on the future. They examine the
present.
[All the authors contributing articles to the Symposium partic-
ipated in the Roundtable Discussion. In alphabetical order they
were: Igor N. Belousovitch of the U.S. Department of State, Vladi-
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mir N. Brovkin from the Kennan Institute, Herbert Hausmaninger
of the University of Vienna Law School, Serge L. Levitsky of the
University of Leiden College of Law (the Netherlands), Leon Lip-
son of Yale Law School, Peter B. Maggs of the University of Illinois
College of Law, John Quigley of Ohio State University College of
Law, and Robert Sharlet of the Political Science Department at
Union College.
[Olga A. Diuzheva, Professor of Family and Civil Law at Mos-
cow State University Law School, joined them and added insight as
a Soviet legal scholar as well as a Soviet citizen. Myron Rush, Pro-
fessor of Government at Cornell University, served as moderator.
Professor Alfred C. Aman, Professor of Law at Cornell Law School,
provided introductory remarks.]
PROFESSOR AMAN:' Welcome to the Roundtable Discus-
sion, the finale of this very exciting conference. I would like to take
this opportunity to thank all of our participants, the most distin-
guished international, interdisciplinary panel. They have provided
us with a number of stimulating papers. They have, indeed, been
shooting a moving target, but I think those of you who have been
with us from the beginning can say the participants provided us
also with an intellectual framework that will help us to assess the
changes in the past and the changes yet to come.
Our moderator today is Professor Myron Rush. Professor
Rush has been with the Government Department of Cornell Uni-
versity since 1964. He is a world renowned expert in Soviet Stud-
ies. He has written several books and has been a consultant to the
State Department and the CIA. Without further ado, I'll turn it
over to Professor Rush.
PROFESSOR RUSH: Thank you. We have had the benefit of
very knowledgeable discussion of the legal perestroika and the whole
reform process over the last two days. We now need to consider a
series of polarities which may determine how successful these
reforms will be.
On the one hand, there is the attempt to set up a Rechtstaat, a
rule of law. On the other hand, we are witnessing to some extent a
breakdown of law as evidenced in the daily papers. There is prag-
matism and counterposed ideology in Gorbachev's approach, as
we were told this morning. 2
1. Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. Director,
Cornell International Legal Studies Program, Faculty Advisor to the Cornell
International Law Journal, 1989-90.
2. Professor Serge L. Levitsky spoke at the Symposium on February 17,
1990. See Levitsky, The Restructuring of Perestroika: Pragmatism and Ideology (The
Preamble to the Constitution of 1977 Revisited), 23 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 227 (1990).
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We should also consider whether Gorbachev may have a goal
in mind and whether that goal is not only different from that envis-
aged by Marx and Lenin, but maybe even radically opposed to it.
Finally, I think it is one of our central purposes in this panel
discussion this afternoon to try to bring things together and to
consider the wider socio-political context in which the legal per-
estroika has to be enacted.
I'll pose certain questions which I think should help us to get
to this central issue and simply ask for volunteers from the panel
for contributions in discussing those questions.
The first question I thought we might begin with is whether
legal perestroika is compatible with the other broad goals of per-
estroika. This includes the question of ideological continuity and
discontinuity and whether there is a Party line which can still be
followed. I'll ask for volunteers to begin the discussion. Professor
Sharlet?
PROFESSOR SHARLET: 3 Apropos to the first part of the
question, Professor Rush, is legal perestroika compatible with the
other goals of broader perestroika? I would say yes, not only com-
patible, but absolutely essential.
Gorbachev, a lawyer, a graduate of Moscow University Juridi-
cal facility who has as his right-hand man Lukyanov, has said
repeatedly in the last five years that it is absolutely essential to
build a juridical scaffolding around the broad process ofperestroika
in order to institutionalize it.
The problem I was talking about yesterday4 is that the scaf-
folding is not really in place effectively and, as a result of institu-
tionalization, is lagging behind. Gorbachev does see legal reform
as essential to the institutionalization, or what he would like to call
the irreversibility of his broader reforms.
One final comment to this effect, I can't think of another Sovi-
et leader who has such a high sense of legal efficacy. That is, effica-
cious use of law to achieve change. That's hopeful and that's inter-
esting. That's against administrative control methods but the oth-
er side of it is that Gorbachev, who after all has been away from law
for many years, doing agricultural work, Komsomol 5 work, doesn't
seem to have any sense of the limits of legal action. He seems to
feel, as you may know, every time a crisis occurs and he gives a
speech, he'll drop a phrase, "We'll pass a law on this." As if that
alone will suffice to deal with the problem.
3. Robert Sharlet, Professor of Political Science, Union College, Schenec-
tady, New York.
4. Professor Sharlet spoke at the Symposium on February 16, 1990. See
Sharlet, Party and Public Ideas in Conflict: Constitutionalism and Civil Rights in the
USSR, 23 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 341, 342 (1990).
5. Komsomol is an acronym for Komunisticheskiy Soyoz Molodyozhi, the Com-
munist Party Youth Union.
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PROFESSOR LEVITSKY: 6 I would like to address the second
part of the question, namely whether there is an ideological con-
tinuity or aberration.
I think that the question itself begs other questions. Namely,
an aberration from what? What is a Party line here? Marx's ideol-
ogy stopped with the overthrow of the old regime and the proleta-
rian revolution. As to what happens afterwards, he did not say,
except in broad outline.
In that sense we can say that Lenin's, Stalin's, Khrushchev's,
and Gorbachev's Party lines were all legitimate because Marx
didn't give any instructions. As long as the General Secretary kept
his own Party line, whichever he chose, he did not specifically con-
tradict anything that Marx said.
Since Marx left no blueprint as to what happens after the over-
throw of the bourgeoisie, you cannot speak of an ideological con-
tinuity if everybody is on his own. Gorbachev right now is
following his own Party line which he himself admitted has to be
subject to change. Life itself will formulate the changes in the
Party line.
PROFESSOR RUSH: I wonder if I can pose a follow-up ques-
tion. You counter-posed pragmatism and ideology, which suggest-
ed that Gorbachev does not have a design for the emerging state of
society. This is certainly one possible interpretation of what's been
happening. His programs have been very fluid. It is possible, as
you suggest, that he's simply adapting his program to develop-
ments as they occur. But I would wonder if, perhaps, in light of
some of the recent developments in the last several months, it
might not be considered whether he doesn't have a goal and per-
haps has been working towards it quietly for several years, a goal
quite distinct from the goal of Marx and Lenin.
Lenin's idea of a vanguard Party is clearly now inconsistent
with the program that Gorbachev has put forward. So, is it possi-
ble, do you think, that Gorbachev has been a crypto-anti-Leninist
for some time and has in view a program that's basically inconsis-
tent with the Leninist program?
PROFESSOR LEVITSKY: I think that Professor Lipson 7 put
it best yesterday when he said that Gorbachev is formulating a pro-
gram and maturing on the job.8 He started out without a set pro-
gram. He was almost a classical apparatchik, with higher
intelligence than the average apparatchik, with a certain amount of
discontent, and with ideas about what should be done. He dis-
6. Serge L. Levitsky, Professor of Law, University of Leiden, School of
Law, The Netherlands.
7. Leon Lipson, H. R. Luce Professor ofJurisprudence, Yale Law School.
8. See Lipson, Keynote Address, Piety and Revision: How Will the Mandarins
Survive Under the Rule of Law?, 23 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 191, 192 (1990). Cf
Sharlet, supra note 4, at 354.
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cussed it with his classmates and, even then, was not quite in agree-
ment with what was going on.
So definitely, he had some reforms on his mind. Whether they
were organized at that time as they are now, or seem to be, I doubt
very much. As Gorbachev progresses though, he certainly has
tried to create a new model for political and ideological circum-
stances which continue to change.
I refuse to believe that when Gorbachev came back from Lith-
uania and stated, "Well, it's not a tragedy," he was referring to the
abolition of the constitutional status of the Party.9 I refuse to be-
lieve for him it was not a tragedy because, after all, his original idea
of renewing socialism included Party supremacy. 10
Now, if the Party can no longer have a say, then he will have no
longer have a say as to which direction it will take and what kind of
niche it will assume and, therefore, he doesn't know where it's
going to go. He's pragmatic enough to go along with it, but
whether he can be very happy about it is unclear. It's something
that was not part of the original perestroika.
I don't think he had the basic agenda which he is now trying to
fulfill, nor could he have foreseen everything. The first wave of
reforms - the traditional reforms to correct shortcomings in Sovi-
et society, reform of labor discipline, policies on drunkenness, the
extraction of unearned income - were traditional concerns ad-
dressed initially by the Party. Gorbachev did the same thing.
PROFESSOR LIPSON: My memory goes back to November
7, 1967, the fiftieth anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution. In the
main corridor of the Sterling law buildings at Yale Law School,
someone, not I, had put up a large poster saying "The Yale Law
School congratulates the Politburo of the Central Committee of
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on the achievement of
fifty years of the union of politics and law." Their irony was
directed perhaps more at some ideology in Yale Law School than
at ideology in Moscow, but there it was.
Certainly, at least until now, the idea of a legal order above the
vicissitudes of Party politics, a legal order in which it is the business
of politics at some level to protect against politics, has not taken
root in the Soviet Union. Law as a means of ordering the society,
of regulating conflicts, even of carrying out policy has not been
one of the most vigorous vectors in the Soviet State. That's shown
by the resources devoted to the training, housing, promotion of,
and attention to persons in the law. It's shown in the way non-
lawyers behave toward the law.
Gorbachev
certainly had
reform in mind,
but that is not to
say that he
planned or would
welcome the demise
of socialism
Gorbachev's basic
agenda
demonstrated
continuity of Soviet
social concerns.
9. KONST. SSSR, art. 6.
10. See Levitsky, supra note 2, at 252-54. Cf infra p. 383.
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We mentioned yesterday the way in which rule of law for a
long time in the Soviet Union, when it was attended to it all, was
thought of as administration by means of law. That is regularity,
law as a more efficient way of promoting uniformity and calculabili-
ty, reliability, Weberian rationality in the carrying out of policy.
That is, they had no room for the Western or North Atlantic myth
of individual rights and legal constitutional order transcendent
over the policy leadership of the country.
Let me, if I may, Mr. Chairman, make a few other little com-
ments bearing on this. First of all, in addition to what we have
heard yesterday and today, very thoughtful comments from all of
the speakers, it seems to me with Gorbachev we have to bear in
mind that he needs time to adjust the level of expectations and
demands so that he doesn't seem to be losing, so that he can give,
ground without having to admit that he's giving ground or adjust-
ing the line.
In War and Peace," there is a general whose chief merit is that
he seems to have planned everything. No matter what happens, he
can adjust it to fit what seems to be his stance. So, he's an element
of rationale, an ostensible or apparent rationality or planfulness.
There's something like that about Gorbachev. Though at the same
time, he did take office impatiently and wanting to, if I may, borrow
a Kennedy cliche "get this country moving again." The law is a way
he thinks of to get it done.
The last thing I want to point out, Mr. Chairman, at this stage
is we have to allow - it's so obvious a fact that it tempts us to
forget it - that they have an enormous country, very large popula-
tion, very large area. All of the resources of technology are
stretched to their limits and they don't have unlimited resources of
technology in order to simply get and keep control over what's
happening in the country, even apart from a crisis period such as
we can all see that's going on now.
The Soviets have been very attentive to centralizing devices.
Look at all the importance attached to the procuracy, to the army,
to, above all, of course, the Party, to control instruments often
multiplied one on top of another. Some people would like the law
to be used in a modernizing state as one of those centralizing cohe-
sion-promoting mechanisms, especially if Party control is weak-
ened as we have all heard it may be.
The regime's attitude toward the law and the role of legal per-
estroika in the many competing policies and tendencies now jostling
one another in the Soviet Union is a very complex relationship.
They don't want the law to interfere with policy. They are begin-
ning to think of the second order policy of promoting the law for
the sake of the first order policies. They want to keep control of
11. L. Tolstoy, War and Peace (trans. 1931).
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the law in order that the law will control the centrifugal tendencies
in the country. It's difficult.
PROFESSOR BROVKIN: 12 I want to come back, if I may, to
the question that was raised earlier concerning two aspects; l3 first,
whether the current ideology is an aberration or shows con-
tinuity;14 and, second, whether Gorbachev had a plan, whether he
had an actual strategy.' 5
Back in 1986, we posed the same questions at one of the dis-
cussions at the Russian Research Center in Harvard, and at that
time the consensus was that he didn't have any plan, that
Gorbachev was experimenting with some cosmetic changes and
nothing substantive was going to come out of it.
I did believe then, but now I even more strongly believe that
he had a plan. It seems to me that if we imagine how Gorbachev
must have felt about things in 1984, it wouldn't be too much of a
speculation to suggest that he saw pervasive corruption.
He was very much informed about what was happening. He
knew that the system was stagnant, corrupt, and unmanageable.
He was brought in by Andropov with a kind of iron-fist team to
clean up the mess and make the system move again without know-
ing where or how. But at least it was a group of people who were
perceived as disciplined, incorruptible, and energetic. He was
jumping on tractors and shaking the hands of collective farmers
even then.
It seems to me that Gorbachev was already then pretty much
thinking how to destroy the Party bureaucracy and the corrupt offi-
cialdom that had a grip on the economy. That, I think, is quite
clear. In that sense, in response to Professor Levitsky, 16 he was
out to destroy the Party apparatus when he came to power.
What comes after that I believe he didn't know and that he
started the process of shaping as it went along. Then the question
of a multiparty system arose. It was not a surprise to me that he
announced two weeks ago that he is going ahead with the abolition
of article 6, and I do not think this was simply a response to the
Lithuania initiative.
12. Vladimir N. Brovkin, Resident Scholar, Kennan Institute 1989-90.
Assistant Professor, Harvard University.
13. See supra p. 379.
14. See id
15. See supra p. 380.
16. See supra pp. 380-81.
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I remember a couple of years ago Gorbachev gave a speech
that somehow went unnoticed where he said, "Comrades, some
people" - he didn't say he believed it - "really think it's actually
very useful and productive to have a multiparty system. Opposition
parties play a very vital role, very useful role, because there is a
counterbalance there and maybe the comrades wish to think about
that, too." And then he said, "Of course, historically it so happens
that Russia has a one-party system. So, since we cannot have oppo-
sition, we are going to have glasnost play the role of an opposition."
And that reasoning was present already. The evaluation of an op-
position party is something positive and necessary and good.
Since there are none, we are going to use glasnost as a substitute for
the real thing.
That brings me to my conclusion. It just seems to me in a
sense there's continuity in Gorbachev's growth. He came out as an
anti-corruption apparatchik, but then he kept on moving towards -
as paradoxical as it may sound - towards pure Leninism in the
sense of Lenin and The State and Revolution. 17 Give power back to
the people, the Soviets. In that sense, he was a Leninist.
But then, when he started building the legal reform, he grew
out of Lenin, he became a Martov. He realized that Lenin was the
author of the monstrous system that he emerged out of. So he
came more to sound like a social democrat. It seems to me that
now he's on the verge of abandoning social democracy and moving
towards constitutional democracy and accepting capitalism. Thus,
Gorbachev's reform amounts to an aberration, a complete break
with the Leninist tradition.
PROFESSOR DIUZHEVA:18 This is very interesting to com-
pare Gorbachev first with Lenin and then with Martov. I never
heard about it before. I like it. There's something in it. In the
USSR, a lot of people who are now in opposition to Gorbachev
consider that he was an anti-Leninist, even when he started per-
estroika. They considered that he was prepared enough and wise
enough to know how the events will develop. When he started the
perestroika, he realized that he was going to produce some kind of
state which would be far from a socialist state. Well, I don't agree.
Yet, I do agree that his views and expectations changed during this
very sophisticated process of perestroika.
He just treasured Leninism. He considered it and he really
believed that this theory works, and will work in our country. When
he changed his mind, it was difficult or impossible for him to
declare that he doesn't consider that this Leninist way is the best
for our country now.
17. V. I. Lenin, The State and Revolution, (2d ed. 1943).
18. Olga A. Diuzheva, Professor of Law, Moscow State University, School
of Law. Visiting Scholar, Cornell Law School, Fall 1989.
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His situation is so sophisticated that it is difficult for him now
to say, "I have been mistaken up to now." Our society likes a
strong leader who just has a hardline opinion on all issues and
pursues his policy in just the same way. The biggest problem for
Gorbachev now is just to declare - to show everybody - that his
expectations and our common expectations of perestroika failed;
that we are starting a new phase based on some other ideological
basis.
It is sometimes very difficult to tell the truth. He is faced with The appearance of
many moments when he must do it. He must assess events as they continuity stemsf rom Gorbachev'
really are. He must declare that now, perhaps, for this period of need to maintain
time, Leninism doesn't work. We must look for something else. his credibility as a
Not forever, but just for this period of time. leader in the face
PROFESSOR RUSH: Professor Brovkin suggested that of ideological fail-
Gorbachev now appears to be a constitutional democrat. That ure.
provides a lead into the next question: whether Gorbachev's
efforts to strengthen his personal power pose dangers to legal
perestroika? Are his efforts to build up the presidency and to acquire
special powers for this office consistent with his program for legal
perestroika? More particularly, are those goals consistent with the
idea that he may be a constitutional democrat?
MR. BELOUSOVITCH:19 Two weeks ago at a roundtable,
just as this one we are having here now, Professor Mishin of Mos-
cow University made the following observation: "[w]hat is the role
of power here? Our people who grow up under conditions of
totalitarianism or absolutism have grown accustomed to thinking
of strong power as one which lashes, beats, and jails. But this is a
very weak power." Then he goes on to criticize the legislative
assembly as being an imperfect concept which needs further devel-
opment. And he concludes with the remark, "Let us state bluntly,
the country needs a president with full rights."
Now, the Soviet media refers to Gorbachev as president in a The new
routine way. But it seems to me that that office is a very imperfect constitutionalpresidenc maypresidency. Although it has a five-year term, he's not elected by mark the end of
the people, and he can be removed by the Congress of People's Party power, but is
Deputies at any time, his five-year term notwithstanding. now still an
So, it's only a halfway step towards a presidency. Now, I'm imperfect concept.
sure that all of us appreciate the fact that there is a wealth of differ-
ence between parliamentary politics and presidential politics.
Technically speaking, the Soviet Union has a parliamentary
model, although it's been run by a single party. But a shift to a
presidency would have the immediate effect of diminishing the role
and the power of the Communist Party itself. The president, even
if he is a member of a majority party, once he is in office may dis-
19. Igor N. Belousovitch, Senior Intelligence Analyst, U.S. Department of
State, Soviet Internal Affairs Division, Bureau of Intelligence and Research,
Office of Analysis for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.
Cornell International Law Journal
The movement
toward a
constitutional
presidenty was
subtle, and
evidently was
planned early in
the perestroika
era
cover that there is a distance between himself and his own party.
He will become an independent political agent with specific consti-
tutional powers. It would mean, really, the end of the Communist
Party and this authority as we know it today.
In addition to diminishing the role of the Party, it would trans-
fer the authority from a Party concept to the state itself. If, as it
seems at present, Gorbachev is trying to shift the base of his power
from the Party to the state, it's not only a difficult political maneu-
ver, but also a unique political maneuver. I was thinking what
would be the closest historical analogy to this and it occurred to
me that perhaps it would be when Constantine the Great shifted
his capital from Rome to the city that ultimately took his name; it's
a watershed of that magnitude. The institution of a real presidency
would terminate the revolutionary period and open a new chapter
in the history of the Soviet Union.
Now, this course of action is not without risk. No matter which
way he turns, he faces horrendous risks, but it seems to me that this
is a step in the right direction. If we are talking about Gorbachev's
efforts to strengthen his personal power, I assume that what is
meant here is precisely this shift to a presidency where he would be
directly elected by the people and be accountable to the people.
The power that he would exercise would be a constitutional power
as spelled out by the future Soviet Constitution.
PROFESSOR RUSH: Your comment suggests that there's
real compatibility and that the shift of his political base to the new
office of President is consistent with the furtherance of legal per-
estroika. I wonder if there might not be some grounds for concern.
For example, there's been discussion in the Party platform of a
need for a separation of powers. The principle has been accepted
and at the same time, it's suggested that the president will be
responsible to the Congress of People's Deputies, which conflicts
with the notion of the separation of powers. As yet, there is no
really independent legislative body. The present Congress of Peo-
ple's Deputies, which is supposed to stay in office for another four
years, is not a wholly independent body.
PROFESSOR MAGGS:20 Well, certainly the shift to a consti-
tutional presidency has been in the works even longer than that
which Professor Brovkin called the destruction of Party power. It
is not a plan which by its nature you can announce with the old
Party apparatchiks in place and I think there are a number of signs
that Gorbachev formed that plan early and quietly and took its ear-
ly stages rather quietly. I don't think there was any other way one
could go about destroying Party power.
20. Peter B. Maggs, Corman Professor of Law, University of Illinois, Col-
lege of Law, Champaign, Illinois.
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To take an example of a quiet plan, the provision for worker
election of factory managers dearly contradicted the old nomen-
klatura system where Party officials were supposed to appoint man-
agers, and so forth. There were studies published in the leading
Soviet legal journal around 1985-86 which examined semi-demo-
cratic elections in Eastern Europe. One study looked at Hungary
where there had been a sort of reserved block for Party bureau-
crats, and the legislature studies how big a majority they needed to
do this and that, which obviously didn't matter in the old Supreme
Soviet because you always got 100 percent.
So, someone was conducting studies. I think one of the things
that Gorbachev did early on was try to assemble a Franklin D.
Roosevelt type brain trust. Sometimes it may have been people in
his brain trust who did the study, and they would later adopt it.
If we look at the transfer of the power in the system, we are
going from a parliamentary system to a presidential system. The
first step was the post-Brezhnev step from a Politburo plus dummy
system to a Politburo plus real leader system, which was one inter-
mediate stage that occurred really with Gorbachev. It might have
occurred with Andropov if he had not been so sick, but that stage
already occurred as the first stage. The next stage which moved
the leader from the role of cardboard figure to real leader was the
presidential stage. 1Ahis could be an intermediary position toward
a parliamentary stage some time in the future. But you can't get to
parliament until you get rid of the Politburo and Party secretariat
as central power authorities.
Creating a multi-party system, I think, is very much like plan-
ning a war or winning a football game. You just can't reveal too
much of your strategy in advance. It's like saying the enemy com-
mander has no plans because he hasn't told us what they are.
PROFESSOR HAUSMANINGER:2 1 I agree with Professor
Maggs up to a point and this point is that the presidential system
might be the only viable route for political development in the
Soviet Union.
I think Gorbachev exploited the parliamentary system to its
full extent during the past year. He was able to make use of the
spirit of democratization. He was also capable of shifting responsi-
bility to the Congress, telling people, look it's not all my fault, turn
to your elected representatives, tell them what they should do. But
this will go only for so long.
Now, he is faced with a crisis of the Party; his power base is
crumbling under him. He is faced with elections that are coming
up that will change the entire political landscape. And what is the
21. Herbert Hausmaninger, Professor of Law, University of Vienna, School
of Law, Vienna, Austria. Visiting Professor, Cornell Law School, Spring 1990.
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future of the Party and the parliamentary system? What is the
future of Gorbachev in a parliamentary system?
The way I see it is that the Communist Party will be one in a
landscape of, perhaps, a dozen or more groups. A parliamentary
system, given the European experience, has only a chance when
there is a limited number of strong parties capable of forming via-
ble, durable coalitions, and I think this is not going to happen in
the Soviet Union. There will be something like the Fourth French
Republic, and if you do not have the constitution of a Fifth Repub-
lic, you will run into deep trouble. Therefore, I think Gorbachev,
in his art of staying a little ahead of times, is realizing the crisis of
his political base, the Party, and the impending crisis of a parlia-
mentary system and is moving towards a system of checks and bal-
ances with a strong presidency. This system will enable him to
continue his political input and will necessarily be based on law.
Therefore, I think, that law will be the basis of his power and that
the further legal development will protect his power in a system
that is closer to the Roman mixed Constitution and the present
American presidential system than to Athenian parliamentary de-
mocracy which has taken root under different political conditions
in European history.
PROFESSOR SHARLET: Just one further minute on this
because I know we have other questions to discuss. I was just
going to make the same observation, Herbert, that I think the
model that they may have in mind is the French Fifth Republic.
Before Gorbachev went to Lithuania, Soviet diplomats were
already invoking the attitude of Lincoln. What did Lincoln do
when Fort Sumter was fired upon and South Carolina left the
union? Of course, we were all thinking at that time that Gorbachev
would block any secession attempt.
He's changed his position. I would guess Charles de Gaulle
would be a more apt role model. In 1958, de Gaulle was asked to
come back during the Algerian crisis to rescue the Fourth Republic
which was in shambles in France. He would not come back and
preside over such a chaotic government; he insisted on a single
seat, strong presidency modeled on the American presidency.
And, of course, it works very well today with Mitterand, a socialist
president with a separate parliamentary power. I think we're going
to have a hybrid, an American-type presidential system with con-
siderable power and a more traditional European parliamentary
system.
But, I would add that there's probably one other role model
that the Soviets may not have in mind, but whom they could favor-
ably cite, and that would be George Washington. If you read the
American Constitution and the documents of the Founding
Fathers, they did not envision the presidency the way it's shaped
today. We give Washington initial credit for enlarging, symboli-
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cally and ceremonially at least, the conception of the presidency.
The conception of the American presidency has grown organically
over time as it has met challenges and overcome crises and I would
guess that once he gets the presidency Gorbachev is going to add
incrementally to his power, to create, in a sense, a stronger and
stronger institution which will not be incompatible with our notion
of things, except that we have a legal culture and the Soviets don't.
PROFESSOR RUSH: Since I see a consensus emerging here
that the shift towards the presidency and Gorbachev's second
request for increased powers for himself in a state office, I would
like to take a contrarian position just for a moment and raise a
question as to whether there may not be some tension between his
notion of the presidency and his program for legal perestroika.
One point I would call attention to is that apparently the
intention is to elect him to this position not on the basis of univer-
sal suffrage or a popular election, but rather to have him elected
again by the Congress of People's Deputies, which is not a wholly
independent body. It raises some question as to what kind of man-
date would be attached to the presidential office.
PROFESSOR LEVITSKY: 22 I strongly support plans to en-
dow the Soviet President with greater powers. Mr. Gorbachev, as
Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, is in an anomalous position.
First, he is not expressly designated as head of state by title. Sec-
ond, his current position is incompatible with the principle of sepa-
ration of powers. As head of state he should not also be the head
of the legislative assembly. Third, under article 13(18) of the
amended Constitution, the resolutions of the Chairman of the
Supreme Soviet can be annulled by the Supreme Soviet itself. Fur-
thermore, the Congress can annul the acts adopted by the
Supreme Soviet under article 108. Thus, the president can cur-
rently be technically paralyzed in the exercise of his duties.
Fourth, I do not see why his present position is not that of the
more powerful Chairman of the Congress of People's Deputies
which has wider jurisdiction than the Supreme Soviet. He cur-
rently presides over that latter body with the misleading title of
Chairman of the Supreme Soviet. If the Chairman of the Supreme
Soviet is also the "President" or "Head of State," then his present
position is not really compatible with a parliamentary government.
Despite the constant references to "parliamentary government"
which we have heard here today, "parliamentary government" sim-
ply means that the ministers and the head of government, the
prime minister or chancellor, for example, are politically responsi-
ble to parliament. The head of state, the president, king, or
22. Levitsky supplemented this portion of his statements by letter. Letter
from Serge L. Levitsky to Pam Benjamin, Symposium Editor, Cornell Interna-
tional Law Journal (Feb. 19, 1990) (on file in the office of the Cornell International
Law Journal).
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emperor, for example, is not accountable in this way. Mr.
Gorbachev does not, at present, have the rights and attributes
reserved for heads of state for most European countries, including
Great Britain, Germany, and France. And, certainly, he does not
enjoy the powers of U.S. presidents.
Finally, and perhaps incidentally, many European democracies
have adopted the practice of electing the head of state by the par-
liament, rather than by the entire population. This did not make
the countries any less democratic. The supremacy of the legislative
branch is often taken for granted, particularly in France under the
Third and Fourth Republics. But nowhere was one person both
the head of state and head of parliament, as in the Soviet Union
today, at least defacto.
PROFESSOR RUSH: I think I'll pose one last question for the
panel because we do want to open up questions to the audience.
The question is in a sense the bottom-line question. What are the
prospects for legal perestroika? How much progress can be
expected in the next several years?
PROFESSOR QUIGLEY:23 I think there is a great deal of
support for the concept of the legal perestroika. As I said this morn-
ing, I think the legal profession in the Soviet Union is probably
playing an important role here.24 Lawyers have advocated these
ideas for some time and now you have legal people at the top of
the governmental system: Ryzhkov, Lukyanov, Gorbachev. These
are people who I think absorbed the concept of the rule of law
through their legal studies. That's not to say, of course, that the
concept will necessarily prevail, but I think that the Soviets are
moving to a point where the people are going to begin to see the
rule of law as an important thing for the society to have.
Professor Lipson said that the Soviet people haven't yet devel-
oped the idea that law is above politics. 2 5 I think there is a lot of
history to overcome to develop that concept. Others here have al-
luded to the social democratic tradition, the "Cadet" 26 tradition of
politics in the early part of the century in Russia. There seems to
be some drawing on that tradition at this point.
I think that Dr. Levitsky has raised an interesting question. I
think that it is important to consider the role of the parliamentary
body. In effect, the power is split between the Congress of Peo-
23. John Quigley, Professor of Law, The Ohio State University, College of
Law, Columbus, Ohio.
24. Professor Quigley spoke at the Symposium on February 17, 1990. See
Quigley, The Soviet Union as a State Under the Rule of Law, 23 CORNELL INT'L L.J.
205, 223 (1990).
25. See supra pp. 381-82.
26. The "Cadet" tradition refers to the Constitutional Democratic Party of
the early twentieth century that opposed czarism and advocated Western-style
government in Russia. 2 M. FLORINSKY, RUSSIA: A HISTORY AND AN INTERPRE-
TATION 1461-62 (1958).
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pie's Deputies and the Supreme Soviet. Does that weaken the par-
liamentary body to the point that it can't really perform the
function that we normally think a parliament should perform?
MR. BELOUSOVITCH: Professor Brovkin, I think, in his
presentation made a very convincing case for the unpredictability
of events during the next few years. 27 I tend to agree with that.
The Soviet State and society are in an extraordinarily fluid condi-
tion right now. We can formulate several scenarios of what may
happen and we can make a plausible case for each one. But I hon-
estly do not know, and I don't think anybody can say with any
degree of certainty, the direction of future events. It's a fascinating
period of history and all we can do is stand by and watch.
PROFESSOR MAGGS: Well, I see two great problems that
legal perestroika faces. One, the economy and, two, the relation of
the center to the republics.
For the economy, there is a sort of five-year plan already out-
lined in various government statements. The first step has to be a
price reform because you can't set individual entities loose without
reasonable prices. First comes price reform and then the creation
of operational entities. Next is the move toward a market system.
The big unknown, of course, is will they get there?
I think everyone is quite certain, for instance, that East Ger-
many will get to a market economy within five years. How to con-
struct a working market economy is rather well known in the legal
profession. You know you need stock corporatibns, et cetera. The
law I talked about this morning shows that there is no real secret as
to what the legal institutions you need are.28
In the case of the relation of the center and the republics, I
think if the Soviet Union is to be preserved, a great deal of legal
creativity is going to be needed. Here is really uncharted territory.
I was reminded reading the gossip column at a newsstand about a
famous couple where apparently the husband liked to think of him-
self as single but wanted the wife to think of herself as married.
They need a similar situation for some of the outlying republics
and the center to reach a compromise which will at least save face
and manage to maintain something short of a horrendous divorce
proceeding. But whether they can get it or not I don't know.
PROFESSOR LIPSON: I'd like to say a couple of words about
the problem that occupied us a few minutes ago in the conflict
between presidential and parliamentary government. A little bit of
the difficulty, it seems to me, comes from the practice which we've
27. Professor Brovkin spoke at the Symposium on February 17, 1990. See
Brovkin, The Politics of Constitutional Reform: The New Power Structure and the Role
of the Party, 23 CORNELL INT'L Lj. 323, 347-49 (1990).
28. Professor Maggs spoke at the Symposium on February 17, 1990. See
Maggs, Constitutional Implications of Changes in Property Rights in the USSR, 23
CORNELL INT'L. L.J. 363, 374-75 (1990).
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seen in various areas of public events since 1985, the practice of
rushing in to pass a law. Mr. Sharlet mentioned that in another
context.
2 9
I remember the well known criminal law jurist Nikiforov who
used to say, "We don't need to pass good laws so much as we need
to follow the laws that we've already passed, good or not so good."
The same point was made by a very different sort of man, the legal
journalist Arkadiy Vaxberg, who foresaw that a number of the stat-
utes that had been passed were in conflict with one another and,
sooner or later, they would have to be regularized. Some statutes
would perhaps turn up better forgotten.
With respect to the presidential-parliamentary conflict, it
seems to me there is nothing inherently absurd or contradictory
about a leader elected by the parliament, perhaps even having the
title of the Chairman of the Parliament or the Parliament's Presidi-
um, who nevertheless controls the government in a presidential
way.
The formal reconciliation of these apparent contradictions
could lie in the relationship between the terms of office of the
members of the parliament and the president, the legislation or
rules with respect to a vote of confidence, whether the president is
subject to being brought down by a vote of no confidence, and
perhaps, also the rules with respect to impeachment. All this illus-
trates, in a way, the historical problefh of the illegitimacy of the
regime, the disorderly succession procedures, and the Party con-
trol or lack of control which, of course, is one of the main items on
the agenda now. And it will take some time for that formal recon-
ciliation to be regularized.
With regard to the intermittent mania for legislation, I recall a
notorious speech made at a scholarly conference years ago by the
then holder of the chair of criminal law in the faculty of law of the
University of Leningrad, Mikhail Davidovitch Shargorodski. He
got into trouble in that speech. One of the things he said was that
the duty of the scholar is to tell truth to powerholders, even though
it happens not to be the truth that the powerholders want to hear.
The mania for For example, said Shargorodski, suppose that the authorita-
legislation inspires tive leaders in our country were to ask the splendid scientists who
the attitude that
passage of a law are in charge of our magnificent outer space program, "Can you
will produce desired take us to Mars next month?" The scientists would certainly an-
effects and people swer, "no, we can't. The scientific principles are known, but the
are loath to see
law's limitations, technology needs a lot of perfecting. There are problems of gui-
dance and propulsion and disposal of wastes and physiological dif-
ficulty and re-entry problems, and all of those may, perhaps, be
resolved with time and effort and expense. But, if you ask us, can
we do it next month, we can't."
29. See supra p. 379.
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But, what happens in the law? Politically authoritative leaders
are rightly incensed at the practice of farmers feeding bread to cat-
tle. And so they say pass a law making it a crime to feed bread to
cattle. We don't tell them that that's not going to stop the practice.
We work up the law and the law is enacted and it doesn't stop the
farmers. Shargorodski got into a lot of trouble with that.
My last point has to do with the way in which all of us are
wrestling with the difficulty of predicting the fate of Gorbachev.
I'm reminded of a pleasant little story from the early 1960s. A
child asks mother, "Mama, tell me, when Lenin was alive, he was
good. And then later, he was still good. He's good now. When
Stalin was alive, he was good. But now it turns out he's bad. And
now we have Khrushchev, he's good. Will he always be good?"
And the mother says, "When he dies, we'll find out."
PROFESSOR SHARLET: The prospects for legal perestroika
wil continue whether or not Gorbachev remains in power because
the basic trend in the Soviet Union since the death of Stalin has
been to greater and greater juridization of everyday life.
But, as to the prospects, I'm filled with a mixture of hope and Sharlet questions
despair: hope because the Soviets are visibly growing a legislative, th legal cultureamong the masses,
legal culture and the new legislative bodies are becoming prolific but doe not ihink
producers of law; despair because of doubts as to whether Mos- legal perestroika
cow's writ runs beyond the suburbs in present circumstances. If it is dependent upon
does run beyond the suburbs, is anyone out there listening to the Gorbachev.
new law given the prevalence of legal nihilism and the shallowness
of legal culture among the mass public?
Finally, as we know, the courts in the Soviet Union have been
dominated by political power for decades, via the telephone from
Party headquarters. John Quigley has rightly outlined some
important steps they took in December to try to insulate the courts
from these pressures,30 but I'll be the skeptic. I'm wondering if
they really can disconnect telephone law.
PROFESSOR DIUZHEVA: I'm not sure that legal perestroika Diuzheva places
much more
will be successful without Gorbachev. We just get used to living in emphasis on
our country in the shadow of a cult of personality. The attempt of Gorbachev's
Gorbachev now to strengthen his power is good because the duties contribution to the
and responsibilities of the so-called president, who is really presi- legal perestroika.
dent only of the Supreme Soviet, are not defined. Gorbachev is
now this president. He is a very strange political figure because the
job of president of Supreme Soviet was not a powerful one. Some-
times the Secretary General of the Communist Party also had the
duties of this presidency.
30. Professor Quigley spoke at the Symposium on February 17, 1990. See
Quigley, supra note 24.
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The president, by himself, was a powerless figure and his
duties were only to sign the decrees of the Supreme Soviet and to
meet new ambassadors of different countries.
Now Gorbachev doesn't have any legal basis for his presidency
and he needs to strengthen his position. If he will succeed in doing
so, I am quite sure that our legal perestroika will progress rapidly
without any problems because Gorbachev initiated it and he's per-
sonally interested.
I wish Mr. Gorbachev to live a long life but we are all human
beings. If something happened to Mr. Gorbachev and another
person, some hardliner, took his place, with all the broad duties of
a president, I'm not sure that legal perestroika would be successful at
all. We can't imagine Yeltsin being a president. I would fear for
legal perestroika if, for instance, Yeltsin became president or a
hardliner. So, I'm not so optimistic as you are, Professor Sharlet.
PROFESSOR HAUSMANINGER: Professor Lipson remarked
very aptly yesterday3 l that the rule of law may be too important to
be entrusted to the lawyers. He must have been thinking of prac-
ticing lawyers, not the law professors.
The leading European legal scholar of the 19th Century,
Friedrich Karl von Savigny, exhibited the same sort of distrust to-
wards the legislatures. Law, according to him, was to be developed
by the judges and the professors. I have mixed feelings about Rus-
sianjudges. I feel more secure with Russian law professors.
They have in mind a pravove gosudarstvo which is a direct trans-
lation from the German Rechtstaat, a notion of nineteenth century
German legal scholarship that rests on the shoulders of two thou-
sand years of European law made and shaped by the universities,
by the law professors. And, indeed, it takes the enthusiasm of the
law professor to nurture and promote this unpopular idea. They
have been successful up to a point.
Take such an unlikely prospect such as an international law
developing. Where would it be today without professors believing
that it does, in fact, exist without constantly projecting their wish-
ful thinking ahead of the political development and forcing politi-
cians to follow and fit the mold? A Soviet legal culture will not be
created overnight, but I place my trust in the Soviet law professors
and Gorbachev's ability to follow their lead.
PROFESSOR BROVKIN: I would like to end on a note of
caution and skepticism. To put it in colorful terms, can you imag-
ine President Bush coming to the United States House of Repre-
sentatives or the Senate and interrupting Congressmen and
Senators, telling them you have one minute, you have half a min-
ute? No, you're not going to talk about this, yes, you're going to
31. See Lipson, supra note 8.
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talk about that, and acting in the fashion Gorbachev acts in the so-
called Soviet legislature?
What worries me about constitutional reform, in general, is
that Gorbachev, as a politician, seems to regard everything as a
process, and that has been very much a key to his success. Every-
thing could be changed at any time. Everything is a process and
you never know what the next step of the process is. Now, facing
these law professors here, I dare not say much about the law, but it
seems to me that there's something sacred about constitutions.
You don't change them every day. A constitution is something
there to stay, something to be respected, something that you guide
your morality on. And it seems to me that if you regard a constitu-
tion as something that could be changed at any time, at any conve-
nient moment - today Gorbachev is the chairtman, tomorrow he
wants to be a president - who knows, maybe when two terms of
the president are up, he wouldn't want to be the "President" or the
"Chairman," or some other term that will be invented to suit his
purposes. So, I don't like the personal approach of Gorbachev.
He seems to shape institutions around his needs.
It reminds me, for example, in 1962, Chancellor Konrad
Adenauer also wanted to promote his stay of power and was play-
ing with the idea of turning the German chancellorship into a
French presidency. And the German politicians and parliamentari-
ans told him, no, you can't do that. We are not going to play with
our Constitution to such an extent. We have created institutions
that are there to stay. Chancellor is chancellor, president is
president.
The final note is that it seems to me that the Russian tradition,
if there was any tradition, at least in 1917, was that you had a legis-
lature, you had a minister-president on the Prussian system who
was pretty much a prime minister in the British sense, and a gov-
ernment responsible to the legislature. The head of the legisla-
ture, like Gorbachev now is, has no precedent in the Russian
tradition. It seems to me the reason Gorbachev likes the French or
the American presidency is that it makes him free from control. In
America, though, there is a strong 200-year tradition of division of
powers. The president cannot do certain things to the Congress.
It's just not done. It's unacceptable.
Gorbachev allows himself all kinds of things in regard to the
legislature. I think it's a dangerous trend if he creates what we
would perceive as an American presidency in Russian conditions.
It would be an uncontrollable, powerful position that would make
it possible for Gorbachev to exercise dictatorial powers.
PROFESSOR LEVITSKY: I wonder, if I may, make just two
brief remarks. One, Professor Brovkin's attitude towards constitu-
tions, of course, reflects very much the American view towards the
Gorbachev
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Constitution, where nothing should be changed unless there is an
amendment, which is very difficult to achieve.
However, this is certainly not the traditional attitude towards
constitutions in Europe. In France, by the time de Gaulle came to
power, there already had been thirty constitutions since the
revolution. The standard joke was that if you wanted to consult a
text of let's say the fifth French constitution, you went to the
Bibliothe'que Nationale, the national library, and they would direct
you to the periodical section. The idea was that a constitution
should be amended to reflect the current trends of society, not to
continue something that has outlived its usefulness and its.
meaning. I would not be as rigid on constitutions and on the
meaning of constitution. The Soviet Union may elect to follow the
French example and not necessarily the American example.
Second, I think there is some misunderstanding about
Gorbachev's present position. Until December 1988, the official
title of the Soviet chief executive was Chairman of the Presidium of
the Supreme Soviet. The Presidium was an important body be-
cause it actually was the embodiment of the collective leadership.
And the Chairman of the Presidium was only the primus inter pares,
the first among equals, and he had to consult with the others.
This changed in December 1988. An amendment was intro-
duced under which the role of the Presidium was downgraded. So
the Presidium still exists, still has internal powers within the coun-
try and within the parliament, but it no longer has the comprehen-
sive powers that the Presidium had before the amendment.
The Chairman, often referred to as President of the Soviet
Union, is no longer the Chairman of the Presidium, but the Chair-
man of the Supreme Soviet.3 2
PROFESSOR RUSH: At this time, we will take questions from
the audience.
PROFESSOR BARCELO: 3 3 No one has made any reference
throughout the day to the Soviet military. I am curious about what
role they could conceivably play as things unfold in the Soviet
Union. What could one say about the role the military might play?
It's clear the farmers don't listen to the law, does the military listen
to the law? How does the military decide what authority to
respect?
PROFESSOR BROVKIN: The Soviet military is as divided as
the rest of Soviet society. We know more about them now than we
have for some time. I have just a couple of brief points.
32. Article 120, paragraph 1, of the amended Soviet Constitution states
that the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR is the highest official of
the Soviet State and represents the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics with the
country and international relations. KONST. SSSR, article 120, para. 1, (1988).
33. John J. Barcel6, III, A. Robert Noll Professor of Law, Cornell Law
School.
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First, the Soviet military is weaker than it has ever been
throughout Soviet history. Its esteem in the population is the low-
est it has been; its resources, its morale, its -disarray, the humilia-
tion of defeat in Afghanistan, the low pay, and the lack of equip-
ment are all problems. Most importantly, national strife is really
tearing the Soviet Army apart. The soldiers group by nationality in
the Soviet military: Ukrainians stick with Ukrainians, Belorussians
with Belorussians, Russians with Russians, let alone non-Slavic
people. The hostility between all these ethnic groups is tremen-
dous. The horrifying stories in the Soviet press about the hard-to-
translate gettovshchina, which is the abuse of young soldiers by jun-
ior sergeants and others for all sorts of purposes, including ex-
ploitation of their labor, and in some cases, sexual exploitation, as
well. In other words, the Soviet military is in a deep crisis. It is
hardly a fighting force.
Another important statistic: forty percent of recruits, con-
scripts, are from central Asia, which makes them practically
unusable and unreliable in seven of the fifteen Soviet republics.
Now, I think all this indicates that in any protracted struggle, the
Soviet military is going to fall apart like the Romanian military did.
However, in a very short strike operation they could be used and
could be effective, as long as it's short, as long as it's not more than
a week long. But, if it does extend to anything more than that, it's
going to crumble into pieces, like everything else.
MR. BELOUSOVITCH: I have just one comment, if I may to
add to what you said. There was a very interesting statement made
by Marshall Yazov in connection with the suppression of ethnic
conflict in the Caucasus. He said that he does not welcome the use
of the armed forces for the restoration of internal order.
The army does not have the stomach to be used to fire on its
own people. I think Yazov understands full well that this would
lower morale still further. There were already some instances re-
ported of troops refusing to fire. And the same thing happened in
Romania at one point.
I think the army realizes that the use of the armed forces to
repress their own people would have a devastating effect, both on
the unity of the army, on the relationship between commanders
and enlisted men, and on political unity of the country. I think this
statement by Yazov was both unusual and very suggestive as to the
dilemma of the armed forces.
PROFESSOR DIUZHEVA: I'm not sure that our army forces
are so weak as Professor Brovkin considers them to be. The events
in Tbilisi this spring showed that the army is good enough to de-
stroy this national movement, to smash any demonstration, to kill
people, and to frighten people. It works. It did ajob in a very bad
way in Tbilisi; the army showed that it can used in these events and
can achieve very sad success.
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Yes, there are problems among the soldiers. There are
problems in the military bureaucracy, but there is one interesting
feature. When Gorbachev started to reduce the armed forces, the
senior officers were expected to retire. But, the young officers of
the Soviet army applied to be retired. All the old men wanted to
stay in the army. All the young officers didn't want to continue
their careers as military men, and it was very surprising. Nobody
expected it. But still Gorbachev reduced the army.
In addition, he managed to maintain very good contact with
the army. He is supported by the army. That's why his position is
not so weak as some people consider it to be. If he encounters
some problems from the opposition, the army is in his arms and it
is strong enough to take care of all these national movements.
I don't know whether it's good or not, perhaps it is bad. It's
not in the maiAstream of perestroika. But if the President will want
some help from army, he will get this help.
PROFESSOR RUSH: At this point I must call on Ms. Benja-
min to make concluding remarks.
MS. BENJAMIN:3 4 When the Cornell International Law Journal
planned this symposium beginning back in April of last year, we
certainly couldn't have predicted the volatile situation in the Soviet
Union today. Similarly, we cannot predict the legal nor political
future of the Soviet Union. The Journal hopes that it has provided
this audience with a basis for understanding future events in the
Soviet Union. I would like to thank the participants for laying the
foundation of that understanding and I would also like to thank
you all for coming.
34. Pam Benjamin, Symposium Editor, Cornell International Law Journal.
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